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Terminate, then Retaliate: Title VII Section 704(a) and
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.
In response to America's demand to improve the social and eco-
nomic positions of minorities relative to other workers in the United
States, Congress attempted to eradicate "the root of the problem"' by
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Described as
"both a centerpiece and an emblem of a kind of second reconstruc-
tion in which America determined to rise above the racism of the
past and to resurrect ideals dormant since inception,"3 Title VII's
clear purpose was to eliminate employment discrimination.4 Over
three decades later, one of the many unresolved Title VII issues is
whether the statute protects individuals from retaliatory conduct by
employers that occurs after the employment relationship has termi-
nated.
Recently, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,5 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that former employees are ex-
cluded from the anti-retaliation protection of Title VII The dissent
responded by presenting this hypothetical situation:
Imagine that on Friday, the first day of the month, XYZ
Corporation decides to terminate two of its line workers,
Smith and Jones, and immediately gives them two weeks'
written notice. Smith and Jones, each believing that she has
been unlawfully discriminated against, file charges with the
EEOC on Monday the fourth. Unable, however, to afford
the luxury of undue optimism, both Smith and Jones explore
the possibility of signing on with XYZ's competitor,
LMNOP, Inc.
On Tuesday the twelfth, XYZ's personnel department re-
ceives a letter from its LMNOP counterpart, requesting
1. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1971) [hereinafter Developments].
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)).
3. D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45
VAND. L. REV. 349,350-51 (1992).
4. See HERMAN BELz, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 7-8 (1991) ("Congress guaran-
teed the right of equal employment opportunity in private industry to every individual.").
5. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996).
6. See id. at 327-32; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (Title VII anti-retaliation
provision); infra text accompanying note 15.
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employment information and references on Smith and
Jones. Annoyed that the pair have filed EEOC charges
against the company, XYZ's personnel director intention-
ally and vindictively prepares false reports for dissemination
to LMNOP. The spurious reports are placed in separate
envelopes and stamped for mailing on Friday the fifteenth,
which also happens to be Smith and Jones's last day at
XYZ. Although Smith's report is included in Friday's out-
going mail, Jones's report is inadvertently excluded, and,
therefore, not sent to LMNOP until Monday the eight-
eenth.7
The dissent noted that while the conduct of the company was
equally reprehensible toward both employees, the majority's analysis
would permit Smith to recover, but would disallow a remedy to
Jones.8 The apparent arbitrariness of this result deserves further at-
tention.
This Note describes the Robinson decision and discusses the
considerations influencing both the majority and dissent.9 Next, the
Note examines the historical background of Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision, focusing particularly on the alternative judicial
interpretations and legislative activity since its enactment." This
Note then considers judicial interpretations of statutory language in
the anti-retaliation provisions of other anti-discrimination statutes."
Finally, this Note analyzes the Fourth Circuit's decision in light of
policy considerations and concludes that a decision extending some
protection to former employees would better serve the remedial pur-
poses of Title ViI.u
Charles T. Robinson alleged that after he charged Shell Oil
Company with racial discrimination in connection with the termina-
tion of his employment, the company "'provided false information
and negative job references'" to prospective employers. 3 He sought
relief under the anti-retaliation provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,14 section 704(a) of Title VII, which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
7. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332 (Hall, J., dissenting).
8. See id at 332-33 (Hall, J., dissenting).
9. See infra notes 13-59 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 76-132 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 133-75 and accompanying text.
13. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327 (citation omitted).
14. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (Title VII anti-retaliation provi-
sion).
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to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment... because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.'
After a divided panel held that Robinson could assert a claim for
retaliation against a former employee," the Fourth Circuit vacated
the decision and reheard the case en banc. 17 Resolving the critical
issue in the case, the court interpreted the term "employees" to in-
clude only persons still working for the defendant at the time the
retaliatory act occurs. 8 Because Robinson's employment terminated
prior t6 the alleged retaliation, the court denied Robinson relief un-
der the anti-retaliation provision.19
Writing for the majority, Judge Hamilton justified this seemingly
harsh decision as the strict construction of a statute that reflects an
unambiguous legislative intent.20 Adherence to the traditional
framework for statutory construction, he noted, required the court to
"'give effect to the legislative will as expressed in the language' ,,21 of
the statute and to interpret words according to their "common us-
age."" Another particularly relevant rule of statutory construction
provides that a definition of a term contained in a definitional section
of the respective statute controls the meaning of that term through-
out the statute.' For purposes of Title VII, § 2000e(f) defines
"employee" as "an individual employed by an employer., 24  The
court relied on this definition to determine that the statute was not
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
16. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-1562, 1995 WL 25831 (4th Cir. Jan. 18,
1995).
17. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328.
18. See id. at 329-30.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 328-30.
21. Id. at 328 (quoting United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 954 (1995)).
22. Id. Judge Hamilton also revealed his reluctance to" 'wrench[J from the words of
a statute a meaning which literally they did not bear in order to escape consequences
thought to be absurd or to entail great hardship.'" Id. (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282
U.S. 55, 60 (1930)).
23. See id. (citing Florida Dep't of Banking & Fin. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 800 F.2d 1534, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 152 (5th ed. 1992) ("A definition which
declares what a term means ... excludes any meaning that is not stated.")).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
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ambiguous and thus did not require further interpretation.' Judge
Hamilton emphasized that in most situations, if a statute is facially
clear and constitutionally permissible, the legal system's responsibil-
ity is to enforce the terms of the statute.2'
The majority conceded that there may be rare exceptions to the
rule that courts should not "stray beyond the plain language of un-
ambiguous statutes" ' either when "literal application of statutory
language would lead to an absurd result,"2 or when the result would
be clearly contrary to congressional intent.29 However, finding no
congressional intent to achieve a result that conflicted with the literal
interpretation of Title VII, the majority held both exceptions inappli-
cable.' Judge Hamilton concluded that the language of the anti-
retaliation provision contained an unambiguous meaning that was
25. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330 ("If Congress intended Title VII to remedy dis-
crimination beyond the employment relationship, then it could have easily done so by
including 'former employee' when defining the term 'employee.' "). The court noted that,
under the rules of statutory construction, the fact that § 2000e(f) did not define
"employee" to include "an individual no longer employed by an employer" excluded the
term's inclusion of former employees. See id. (citing SINGER, supra note 23, at 152).
Further, the court applied an extension of this logic to determine that the definition itself
was not ambiguous. See id. The court looked to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY to find the
term "employed," as contained in § 2000e(f), defined as "'performing work under an
employer-employee relationship'" rather than "no longer performing work under an
employer-employee relationship." Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 525 (6th ed.
1990)). Likewise, the court determined the common usage of § 2000e(f)'s "employer" to
mean "'one who employs the services of others'" rather than "one who no longer em-
ploys the services of others." Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 525).
But see id. at 335 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the statute's tautological definition of the
term.., one could no more comprehend what an employee is than one could ascertain
the legal essence of the term designee, if defined merely as an 'individual designated by a
designator.' ").
26. See id. at 329 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Mur-
phy, 35 F.3d at 145.
27. Id. (citing Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145).
28. Id. (citing Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)). Under this exception, the
majority recognized that the resulting absurdity "'must be so gross as to shock the gen-
eral moral or common sense.'" Id. (quoting Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60). Further, application
of the exception requires a showing that Congress did not intend the literal meaning of
the statute to prevail. See id.
29. See id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
This exception requires that the legislative body clearly express the contrary intent. See
id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983)). Additionally, if no legislative
intent is expressed, the court "must assume that Congress intended to convey the lan-
guage's ordinary meaning." Id (citing United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935
F.2d 501,506 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1989)).
30. See id. at 330. The majority interpreted both the absence of a reference to former
employees in section 704(a) and the inclusion of the term "applicants for employment" as
strong evidence of congressional intent not to include former employees. See id.
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not inconsistent with legislative intent, and thus did not permit fur-
ther interpretation by the court."
Having refused to apply section 704(a) to former employees, the
majority noted some additional policy considerations in support of
that conclusion.32 First, the majority indicated that the types of prac-
tices forbidden by certain sections of Title VII-practices
"particularly related to employment, not post-employment relation-
ships"-illuminated the proper scope of the anti-retaliation
provision.3 Second, the majority contended that the second element
of a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation--" 'an adverse employ-
ment action' "-required that the employer's adverse action "be in
relation to its own act of employing the employee bringing the
charge."' 4 Thus, the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision was to
permit applicants or employees to bring discrimination actions under
Title VII without fear of retaliation within the employment relation-
ship.3
5
Finally, the majority addressed the abundance of authority in
conflict with its decision.36 Acknowledging the more popular con-
struction of the term "employee," which includes former employees
"' "as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of
the employment relationship," ' "' the majority recognized the ra-
tionale supporting this interpretation-that literal application of the
term might defeat the "underlying policies of Title VII to eradicate
discrimination in the work place."' The majority criticized the cir-
cuits adhering to the broader interpretation for disregarding the
established rules of statutory construction39 and for relying on policy
31. See id,
32. See id. at 330-31.
33. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994)).
34. Id. at 331 (citing Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991); Williams
v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452,457 (4th Cir. 1989)).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id (quoting Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(quoting EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir.
1987))).
38. Id. at 331-32 (citing Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194,200 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 590 (1994); Passer, 935 F.2d at 331; Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d
1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162,
1165-66 (10th Cir. 1977)).
39. See id at 332. Judge Hamilton noted the Supreme Court's primary rule of statu-
tory construction: "'[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unam-
biguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.'" Id (quoting
380 [Vol. 75
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arguments to "divine what they posit as Congress' intent from the
reach of Title VII."' While the court admitted that extending the
anti-retaliation provision to cover former employees was "tantalizing
fruit," the majority considered itself bound by statutory language it
believed communicated an unambiguous congressional intent.41
In dissent, Judge Hall initially responded to the majority's asser-
tion that the statute should be strictly construed by presenting a
hypothetical situation illustrating the absurdity that could result from
such a rigid interpretation.4 2 Temporarily assuming the clarity of the
term "employee," the dissent focused on the application of the excep-
tions to the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction.4 3 Judge
Hall contended that by examining the congressional purposes of Title
VII, the legislative intent to avoid the absurd results presented by the
hypothetical was obvious.4* According to him, the broad sweep and
remedial nature of Title VII,' along with the "detailed enforcement
procedure," demonstrated that Congress was "serious about eradi-
cating discrimination and its invidious effects within the employment
relationship."'47
Judge Hall suggested that the majority had given employers




42. See id. at 332-33 (Hall, J., dissenting). This hypothetical is quoted in the text ac-
companying supra note 7. Judge Hall presented a situation where two employees of the
same company are given termination notices, file discrimination claims, and seek alterna-
tive employment. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332 (Hall, J., dissenting). If prospective
employers request employment references from the original employer and the original
employer provides retaliatory negative job references, the existence of a section 704(a)
claim will depend upon whether the individual was still working for the original employer
at the time the negative reference was given. See id. at 332-33 (Hall, J., dissenting). Such
disparate treatment of employers' actions occurring only days apart gives employers the
incentive to retaliate freely once the employment relationship terminates and leaves em-
ployees unprotected. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
43. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 333-35 (Hall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 329-30
(describing the exceptions which permit courts to look beyond the plain language of un-
ambiguous statutes and dismissing their application to section 704(a)); supra notes 27-31
and accompanying text (presenting the majority's statutory construction analysis).
44. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 333 (Hall, J., dissenting).
45. See id (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[l]t applies to virtually all entities that affect the
employment relationship, and it proscribes a vast range of ignoble behavior.").
46. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[Ejederal courts ... are accorded broad power to grant
legal and equitable relief.").
47. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall noted that the inclusion of the anti-
retaliation provision evidenced a congressional understanding that the goal of eliminating
discrimination could be effectively enforced only if people could assert claims without
fear of retribution. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
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"carte blanche" to retaliate and noted that the resulting impediment
to Title VII's enforcement mechanism would hinder Congress's goals
in two ways." First, the dissent asserted that the ruling would allow
employers to escape sanctions for culpable conduct and would be in-
terpreted by employers as a license to retaliate against employees as
long as employment is first terminated. Second, and possibly more
problematic, would be the resulting effect on remaining employees'
incentive to bring actions for subsequent violations; employees fear-
ful of losing their jobs would abstain from action simply to avoid
retaliation.' Criticizing the majority's "myopic approach" for inter-
preting a section intended to strengthen Title VII protection in a
manner that would weaken it,"1 the dissent embraced a test that fo-
cused on "whether the alleged retaliation arose from the employment
relationship or was related to the employment.""
After addressing the absurdity that could stem from the major-
ity's conclusion and disputing the intent behind the statute, the
dissent confronted the ambiguity of the term "employee." 3 Noting
the similar conclusions of six other circuits, Judge Hall found the
term inherently ambiguous.' Although the definitional section of
Title VII offers a meaning for the term,55 the dissent argued that
comprehension of the term "employee" required an understanding of
its root-"to employ"-a term that carries different contextual
meanings.56 Judge Hall's interpretation of congressional intent-
eradication of workplace discrimination-led him to conclude that
section 704(a)'s protection should be extended to employees dis-
criminated against if the retaliation arose from or was related to the
48. See id. at 333-34 (Hall, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 333-34 & 334 n.4 (Hall, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 334 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[A]n aggrieved person should not be forced
to remain with an abusive employer solely to ensure that he or she receives the full pro-
tection of Title VII.").
51. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194,200
(3d Cir. 1994); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978)).
53. See id at 335 (Hall, J., dissenting).
54. See id. (Hall, I., dissenting).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
56. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 335 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall explained:
For example, a manufacturing concern may have been, or will be a major
"employer," without regard to any particular worker. Similarly, a recent retiree
of Company X receiving a gold watch for his or her faithful service may be in-
troduced at the year-end awards banquet as a long-time "employee" of the
company.
IM at 335 n.9 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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employment relationship.' Judge Murnaghan, writing separately in
dissent, illustrated the contextual variation of employment-related
terminology by noting that, "despite the long lapse of time, Joe Di-
Maggio can still be referred to as a center fielder for the New York
Yankees."'58 Essentially, the dissenters believed that the ambiguity of
the term, combined with the absurdity that an alternative conclusion
might cause, imposed upon them a duty to construe the term
"employee" broadly.59
The disputed definition of the term "employee" is the most re-
cent controversy stemming from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' The thrust of the substantive provisions of Title VII is to pro-
hibit employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."'" In the activist political atmosphere of the 1960s,
Congress sought to enact effective legislation that would "open em-
ployment opportunities for [African-Americans] in occupations
which have been traditionally closed to them."'62 The limited effect of
prior legislative efforts' and the failure of civil rights advocates to
57. See id. at 334-35 (Hall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 335 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Judge Murnaghan agreed with Judge
Hall's analysis of the meaning of section 704(a). See id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
59. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting); id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
60. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)). As one commentator
has noted: "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the most important civil rights legislation of
this century. Title VII of that Act... has been its most important part." Norbert Schlei,
Foreword to BARBARA L. SCILEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW at vii (2d ed. 1983).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
62. 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). In the words of one
commentator:
Title VII reflected for America a new sense of national identity, an America no
longer ambivalent about who it included or what its values were. It was thus
both a vehicle for legal prohibitions and a celebration of moral rebirth. It served
as both law and as a ceremony of redemption.
Jones, supra note 3, at 351 (footnote omitted). But see Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Em-
ployee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 77 n.10
(1984) (noting that "[r]ecent statistics show that disparities in income and employment
continue unabated") (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
1957-1983, at 60-61 (1983)).
63. See BELZ, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing federal and state governmental attempts
to discourage employment discrimination); Larry M. Parsons, Title VII Remedies: Rein-
statement and the Innocent Incumbent Employee, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1445-46 (1989)
(tracing history of federal efforts to eradicate employment discrimination from the adop-
tion of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to pre-1960 congressional
rejection of employment regulation bills).
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successfully place the struggle against discrimination on the national
political agenda" had left America's minority work force in a disad-
vantaged position." Activists finally succeeded in "penetrating the
sphere of private employment relations" by attaching Title VII to the
"more widely supported proposals to ban discrimination in public
facilities and accommodations, elections, and public education.""
The development of the judicial interpretation of Title VII has
been greatly influenced by the Supreme Court's recognition that
"[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain...
. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities ... [by] the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification."67 Seeking to im-
prove the relative economic position of the African-American
community, Congress had proscribed a practice thought to be the
major contributor to the persistent disparity-discrimination in em-
ployment.6" Due to the widespread legislative and political
commitment to these policies, along with the difficulties inherent in
their effective enforcement, courts have interpreted the provisions of
Title VII liberally.69
A critical provision of Title VII is section 704(a), 0 which makes
it unlawful for "an employer to discriminate against any of his em-
ployees or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchap-
ter, or... participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
64. See BELZ, supra note 4, at 7.
65. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 3, at 351 n.6 (noting that before 1964 few blacks occu-
pied skilled jobs and that the relative unemployment rate in the non-white community
had nearly doubled between 1947 and 1962).
66. BELZ, supra note 4, at 8.
67. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-31 (1971); see also Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (construing impetus behind Title VII as a de-
sire to " 'achieve equality'... 'and to [cause employers to] endeavor to eliminate, so far
as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's his-
tory' "); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (finding
congressional intent to equalize employment opportunities and eliminate discriminatory
practices). Thus, the essence of Title VII is the deterrence of workplace discrimination
and the elimination of unlawful employment practices. See Parsons, supra note 63, at
1447-48. Additionally, the Court has noted the importance of returning victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination to their prediscrimination state. See Moody, 422 U.S. at 418; Parsons,
supra note 63, at 1448.
68. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1113-14.
69. See, e.g., Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th
Cir. 1977) ("A statute which is remedial in nature should be liberally construed.").
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994).
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or hearing under this subchapter."71 The substantial participation of
the individual in the enforcement process governing Title VII claimse
necessitates a protective measure to mitigate the deterrent effect that
potential adverse employment consequences would surely have on
would-be claimants or participants.' Additionally, the protection
offered by section 704(a) extends to activities beyond the assertion of
Title VII claims and includes a broad range of opposition to unlawful
employment practices.7' If Congress had prohibited discrimination
71. Id.; see R. Bales, A New Standard for Title VII Opposition Cases: Fitting the Per-
sonal Manager Double Standard Into a Cognizable Framework, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 95, 96-
97 (1994) (discussing Title VII protections); Edward C. Walterscheid, A Question of Re-
taliation Opposition Conduct as Protected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L. REv. 391, 391 (1988) ("A corollary to the grant of a wide variety
of statutorily protected rights has been the grant of statutory protection against retalia-
tion for the exercise of those rights.") (footnotes omitted).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Before a "person claiming to be aggrieved" may seek a
remedy through the court system, he must file a charge, or a charge must be filed on his
behalf, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging a viola-
tion of Title VII. See id.; see also Robert Keith Shikiar, Employment Discrimination:
Title VII Retaliation Claims, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1168, 1168-69 (1989) (arguing that
the procedural delay between the filing of a charge and the EEOC's final disposition gives
rise to the need for preliminary injunctive relief). If the EEOC finds, after investigation,
"reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true," it must attempt to eliminate the
discriminatory practice through "informal methods of conference, conciliation and per-
suasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If attempts to induce voluntary compliance are
unsuccessful, the EEOC may bring a civil action against a nongovernmental respondent.
See id, § 2000e-5(f). If the EEOC does not file a charge, it notifies the individual of his
right to sue in federal district court. See id Alternatively, a commissioner of the EEOC
may file a charge in place of an aggrieved individual. See id. § 2000e-5(b). However, the
EEOC's independent action generally focuses on large employers or labor organizations,
so in most situations the individual seeking redress must file the charge himself. See Jo-
seph Kattan, Employee Opposition to Discriminatory Employment Practices: Protection
From Reprisal Under Title VII, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217,226-27 (1977).
73. See Kattan, supra note 72, at 226-27 ("[T]he principal purpose of section 704(a) is
to protect persons who use the Act's statutory machinery to assert discrimination griev-
ances or who otherwise participate in or cooperate with the enforcement process. Access
to this machinery is indispensable to realization of the goals of the Act."). Commonly
referred to as the "participation clause," see, e.g., Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 783 F.2d
745, 748 (6th Cir. 1986) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3's protection of employees who
have "participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" under Title
VII), this protection recognizes that employer retaliation is a "serious threat to employ-
ees' economic security and thus to the efficient operation of the enforcement process."
Kattan, supra note 72, at 227.
74. See Kattan, supra note 72, at 232-46. See generally Walterscheid, supra note 71
(analyzing the extent of section 704(a)'s protection of opposition conduct). Though more
restrictive than the participation clause because it does not protect all opposition conduct,
the "opposition clause" protects activities such as employee investigation or protest of
unlawful employment practices. See Kattan, supra note 72, at 232 (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3's protection of employees who have "opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment" practice by Title VII) ("[I]f the form of an employee's opposition is not so
destructive of important social or business interests as to outweigh the objectives of Sec-
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on the basis of "race, sex, religion, color, or national origin,"' but
permitted discrimination against individuals who pursued relief or
opposed unlawful practices, the risk of opposing such practices often
would outweigh the potential gain to an aggrieved party. By reducing
the threat of employer reprisal, section 704(a) serves a vital role in
the enforcement mechanism of Title VII.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination, an
individual must show: (1) that he engaged in activity protected by
Title VII;76 (2) that an adverse employment action occurred;7 and (3)
that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and
the adverse consequence." Once the plaintiff has established these
three elements, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the plain-
tiffs showing with "legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse
action."" If the employer succeeds, the burden of proof returns to
the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
proffered reasons are pretextual and that discrimination was a prime
motive for the adverse action."
tion 704(a) which are served by protecting it... the opposition will normally be held to be
protected.") (citation omitted).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
76. See, e.g., Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.
1985). Filing and pursuing a Title VII claim is protected by the participation clause. The
range of activities protected by the opposition clause is disputed. Its limits, however, may
be found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), where the Supreme
Court stated that employers "may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in
unlawful, disruptive acts ... but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all
races." Id. at 804.
77. See, e.g., Ross, 759 F.2d at 365. Such adverse actions include "discharge, demo-
tion, harassment, intimidation, nonpromotion, suspension, undesirable transfer or
assignment, temporary layoff, refusal to hire, withholding wages" and, potentially, "poor
employment references." Gary Phelan, Employee Opposition Under Title VI. Immunity
to Aggrieved Persons Filing Discrimination Claims, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 42, 42-43 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
78. See, e.g., Ross, 759 F.2d at 365. This nebulous connection is often the most diffi-
cult element of a section 704(a) claim to prove. One commentator, noting the
inconsistency among the circuits regarding "the proximity in time sufficient to establish a
causal connection," has suggested that it "depend[s] in no small measure on the court's
subjective discretion." Walterscheid, supra note 71, at 408.
79. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Ross, 759
F.2d at 365).
80. See id. The Williams court noted that the "ultimate burden of persuasion in a
Title VII ... employment discrimination case never 'shifts' from the plaintiff," but that
the "shifting intermediate evidentiary burdens ... merely expedite the process of plain-
tiff's proof." Id. at 456 n.2 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 480 U.S. 228, 245-46 (1989) (stating that the burden of persua-
sion remains with the plaintiff). For a thorough discussion of this framework, see
Walterscheid, supra note 71, at 394-426.
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Scant legislative history" and limited Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of section 704(a) have resulted in confusing and conflicting
treatment of the provision.' In the context of retaliation claims by
former employees, the meaning of the term "employee" has been
particularly difficult for courts to interpret." The federal courts of
appeals are currently divided on the issue, with the majority extend-
ing section 704(a)'s protection to individuals who suffer retaliation
arising out of or related to the employment relationship." Addition-
ally, many circuits have construed similar anti-retaliation provisions
in the Fair Labor Standards Act," the National Labor Relations
ActY and the Age Discrimination in Employment Acte to protect
81. See Kattan, supra note 72, at 223 & n.30 (noting the limited congressional consid-
eration of section704(a) and suggesting that "[t]he paucity of material evincing
congressional intent with respect to the provision ... counsels that it be construed in the
overall historical context of the legislation"); Walterseheid, supra note 71, at 393 ("One of
the inherent difficulties in ascertaining the purpose and extent of coverage of... Section
704(a) is the almost total absence of any legislative history.").
82. See Search of WESTLAW, Supreme Court Database (Sept. 30, 1996) (search for
records containing the word "section" within two words of "704(a)") (revealing that only
three Supreme Court opinions refer to section 704(a) in any way: Great Am. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 369-70 nn.4-6, 376-77 (1979); Emporium Capwell
Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1975); and McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796-97 (1973)); see also Walterscheid, supra note
71, at 394 n.22 (noting retrieval of the same three cases in a 1986 computer search). In
Emporium Capwell, the Court refused to define the reach of the opposition clause despite
acknowledging the unresolved issue. See 420 U.S. at 71 n.25.
83. See, e.g., Patricia Davidson, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title VII: Dis-
tinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. GiN. L. REv. 203,
214-22 (1984) (discussing contrasting methods of distinguishing whether an individual is
an employee or an independent contractor); Kattan, supra note 72, at 242-46 (discussing
the extent of section 704(a)'s protection of opposition conduct); Phelan, supra note 77, at
43 (discussing whether employers' lawsuits subsequent to Title VII claims constitute un-
lawful retaliation).
84. See Dowd, supra note 62, at 80-114 (discussing the distinction between employees
and independent contractors under section 704(a) and arguing that courts should employ
an "economic reality" test to make this determination rather than the widely used
"employer control" test).
85. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194,200 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 115
S. Ct. 590 (1994); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1331 & n.41 (5th Cir. 1991);
Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc.,
670 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Antonio v. Wards Cove
Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge
Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce,
565 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1977).
86. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 147 (6th Cir. 1977)
(concluding that the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, though
using the term "employee," actually applied to former employees). For the text of the
Fair Labor Standards Act anti-retaliation provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994).
87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1967) ("We
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former employees.' Before discussing the Fourth Circuit's persistent
refusal to recognize section 704(a) protection for former employees,
consideration of the rationale employed by these decisions, as well as
the underlying legislative policy, is necessary.
In a series of opinions that are notable for their brevity,' the
majority of circuits quickly aligned to protect former employees from
employer retaliation. The issue of section 704(a)'s application to
former employees was first considered in Rutherford v. American
Bank of Commerce,91 where the Tenth Circuit cited the remedial na-
ture of Title VII and the interpretation of the term in other remedial
contexts as indicative of congressional intent.' The Rutherford court
stated that a narrow reading of the statute excluding former employ-
ees from protection was unjustified and noted that "[a] statute which
is remedial in nature should be liberally construed."" The next year,
in Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co.,94 the Second Circuit held that while
a literal reading of section 704(a) might be construed to require an
existing employment relationship, "such a narrow construction would
hold that where an employer refuses to rehire a former employee because the employee
has filed unfair labor practice charges agianst the employer. . ., the employer has violated
[the NLRB anti-retaliation provision]."). For the text of the National Labor Relations
Act anti-retaliation provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1994).
88. See, e.g., Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(construing the anti-retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
to apply to former employees). For the text of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act anti-retaliation provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994).
89. See Patricia A. Moore, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of Title VII
to Post-Employment Retaliation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 205,214-18 (1993).
90. See, e.g., Huber Corp., 927 F.2d at 1331 (resolving issue in one paragraph);
O'Brien, 670 F.2d at 869 (resolving issue in one sentence).
91. 565 F.2d 1162,1164-66 (10th Cir. 1977).
92. See id The Tenth Circuit quoted Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petro-
leum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972), regarding former employees' need for
protection from retaliation:
"The possibility of retaliation, however, is far from being "remote and specula-
tive" with respect to former employees for three reasons. First, it is a fact of
business life that.employers almost invariably require prospective employees to
provide the names of their previous employers as references when applying for a
job. Defendant's former employees could be severely handicapped in their ef-
forts to obtain new jobs if the defendant should brand them as "informers" when
references are sought. Second, there is the possibility that a former employee
may be subjected to retaliation by his new employer if that employer finds out
that the employee has in the past cooperated with the Secretary. Third, a former
employee may find it desirable or necessary to seek reemployment with the de-
fendant. In such a case the former employee would stand the same risk of
retaliation as the present employee."
Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1166 (quoting Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 306).
93. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165.
94. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
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not give effect to the statute's purpose, which is to furnish a remedy
against an employer's use of discrimination in connection with a pro-
spective, present or past employment relationship to cause harm to
another."'9 Further, the court refused to accept that a literal reading
of the statute actually excluded former employees." Finding the use
of the term "individual" in other sections of Title VII to be a mecha-
nism to protect those who could not be classified as employees'
rather than an exclusion of former employees from protection, the
court recognized that "once an employment relationship has been
created, use of the term 'employee' in referring to a former em-
ployee, while colloquial, is not inappropriate."9
While most circuits have aligned themselves with the Rutherford
and Pantchenko courts based on their interpretations of the legisla-
tive purpose behind Title VII and section 704(a),99 other circuits have
been unpersuaded by the logic of these interpretations in the face of
the plain meaning of the statutory language. ' In Reed v. Shepard,1'
95. Id. at 1055.
96. See id.
97. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-3) ("An applicant for employment... may
not be described as an 'employee.' Similarly, a person seeking employment through an
agency is not an employee of the agency .... In such cases use of the word 'individual'
rather than 'employee' is more appropriate .. .
98. Id.
99. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198-202 (3d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that plaintiff was not barred from a section 704(a) claim merely because she
was not an employee "at the time her former employer potentially acted to interfere with
her prospects of future employment"); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1331
(5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1166
(10th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that "[t]here is no ground for affording any less pro-
tection [against retaliation] to defendant's former employees than to its present
employees"); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
uphold the district court determination that "an employer may not retaliate either against
his 'employees' or 'applicants for employment' but can retaliate against anybody else in
the world, including his former employees"); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869
(9th Cir. 1982) ("The allegations ... that [the defendant] refused to rehire and gave bad
recommendations after termination and the filing of EEOC charges, are sufficient to as-
sert retaliation claims."), overruled on other grounds by Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing
Co., 810 F.2d 1477,1481-82 (9th Cir. 1987).
100. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93
(7th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court vacated the Polsby decision "in light of the position
asserted by the Acting Solicitor General in his brief for the United States." Polsby, 507
U.S. at 1048. The brief successfully argued that "because the decision of the court of ap-
peals constitutes an alternative ground for decision unnecessary to the result and does not
rest on an adversary presentation of the question, there is no reason for this Court to con-
sider the question at this time." Brief for Respondents at 9, Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S.
1048 (1993) (No. 92-966).
101. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
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the Seventh Circuit deviated from the majority of circuits by holding
that under section 704(a), "it is an employee's discharge or other em-
ployment impairment that evidences actionable retaliation, and not
events subsequent to and unrelated to his employment." '12 Without
addressing the broad interpretation given section 704(a) by other cir-
cuits, the Reed court held that the "alleged retaliatory activit[y] took
place after the termination of Reed's employment and was therefore
not an adverse employment action."10 3 Although the Reed court indi-
cated the existence of other possible bases of decision, the
implication of its statements concerning the timing of the alleged re-
taliation with regard to the termination of employment is clear; it did
not consider the anti-retaliation provision to apply to actions occur-
ring after the employment had terminated.'" Given the broad gap
between the alleged retaliatory acts and the employment context, the
Reed decision appears to be influenced as much by the court's deter-
mination of the acts' lack of relation to "adverse employment
action[s]" as by its interpretation of the term "employee."
No such ambiguity concerning the alleged retaliation's connec-
tion to the employment context was present when the Fourth Circuit
102. 1I at 492-93. Reed's termination occurred amidst a particularly "unprofessional
atmosphere" at the jail where she worked. Id. at 486. For example, Reed contended that
she was handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port doors, that she was sub-
jected to suggestive remarks ... , that conversations often centered around oral
sex, that she was physically hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head was
grabbed and forcefully placed in members [sic] laps, and that she was the subject
of lewd jokes and remarks. She testified that she had chairs pulled out from un-
der her, a cattle prod with an electrical shock was placed between her legs, and
that they frequently tickled her. She was placed in a laundry basket, handcuffed
inside an elevator, handcuffed to a toilet and her face pushed into the water, and
maced.
I&. (quoting the unpublished opinion of Judge Gene E. Brooks, May 25, 1990, at 9).
Noting that Reed "experienced this depravity with amazing resilience, but ... also rel-
ished reciprocating in kind," the court may have been influenced by Reed's participation
in behavior that the court found "repulsive." See ic Reed's termination itself followed
an investigation into her involvement in trafficking marijuana to prisoners and encourag-
ing two female inmates to beat another inmate. See id. at 487.
103. Id. at 492-93.
104. See id. The decision may have been colored not only by the circumstances sur-
rounding the termination, but also by the nature of the claimed retaliatory acts which
took several forms, including
having the Sheriff's Department's investigation file concerning her alleged ille-
gal jail activities investigated by a grand jury, a mysterious attack on her person
by a disguised assailant urging her to drop her case against the department, dis-
turbing late night phone calls threatening her with reprisals for her lawsuit, and
someone shooting at her car with a gun while she was driving.
Id. at 492. The court suggested that the plaintiff might have a state law tort claim or pos-
sibly grounds for a criminal charge. See adL at 493.
390 [Vol. 75
TERMINATE THEN RETALIATE
first considered the issue in Polsby v. Chase.' 5 The Polsby court criti-
cized the other circuits for "bas[ing] their decisions entirely on
dubious considerations of policy and the supposed purpose of the
statute [and] ignoring its clear language."'0 5 Far beyond the simple
interpretation offered by the Reed decision, the Polsby court refused
to protect former employees from retaliation, interpreting both sec-
tion 704(a)'s inclusion of "applicant[s] for employment" and its
silence with regard to "former employees" as precluding application
of the statute to the latter group."° Further, the court felt that the
"paucity of legislative history, if offering any guidance on the issue,
and policy considerations actually support a normal reading of the
statute without adding former employees."'0 8 Contending that Con-
gress had provided Title VII claimants with exclusively equitable
remedies" to accomplish its twin goals of providing "minorities the
opportunity 'to be hired on the basis of merit'" and eliminating
105. 970 F.2d 1360, 1364-67 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby
v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993). The plaintiff doctor in Polsby complained of an alleg-
edly adverse reference letter sent to the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
and additional defamatory statements. See id. at 1362.
106. Id. at 1365.
107. See id. ("Congress could certainly have also included a former employee if it de-
sired."). But see Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978)
("[U]se of the term 'employee' in referring to a former employee, while colloquial, is not
inappropriate."). The Polsby court also felt that the statute's definition of "unlawful em-
ployment practice[s]" forbade practices particularly related to employment, not practices
occurring after the employment relationship has ended. See 970 F.2d at 1365 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)).
108. Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365 (citing Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d
1527,1536-42 (11th Cir. 1990) (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring)).
109. See id. at 1366. The court cited Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University, 939 F.2d 204, 208 (4th Cir. 1991), for the proposition that Title VII provides
only equitable relief "such as reinstatement, back pay, and injunctions against further
violations." The relevant part of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employ-
ment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate.
At the time, some disagreement existed over the proper interpretation of the provision.
Compare Eastman, 939 F.2d at 208 (Title VII does not provide legal remedies) with
Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1535-36 (allowing compensatory, but not punitive, damages to Title
VII claimant). Congress ended the debate, however, by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (1994)), which explicitly grants section 704(a) plaintiffs the right to
"compensatory and punitive damages." See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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workplace discrimination,11° the court felt that the equitable means to
remedy post-employment retaliation "would entail calculating future
damages and is far too speculative.... Given its interpretation of the
Title VII relief provisions, the Polsby court concluded that policy
considerations made it "even more likely that Congress said what it
meant" in the "clear language of the statute." ' 2
However, just as the Supreme Court vacated the Polsby court's
conclusion," the Civil Rights Act of 1991 impeached the Polsby
court's reasoning.1 4 Consistent with its civil rights initiatives and en-
actments of the past" and in response to a recent Supreme Court
decision that had "weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal
civil rights protections, '1. 6 Congress sought to "provide appropriate
remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in
the workplace" and to "expandfl the scope of relevant civil rights
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of dis-
crimination. 1 7 Specifically, Congress enacted a provision that
expanded the remedies available to section 704(a) plaintiffs beyond
"'any ... equitable relief ... the court deems proper' ,,. to include
110. Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365-66 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey introducing the bill)). The court also argued that the remedies provided by
the statute were intended to "mak[e] a complainant whole without penalizing the em-
ployer." Id. at 1366.
111. 1d. The court stated that "[a]lthough a situation may arise where fashioning equi-
table relief presents no problems, the better solution is to allow the ex-employee to seek
either state or other federal law remedies against the former employer or the same Title
VII remedies against the prospective employer." Id.
112. Id. at 1367.
113. See Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993). The Supreme Court did not address
the merits of the case, but vacated due to the improper consideration of the question. See
id. at 1048; Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328 n.1 (noting that the Supreme Court's failure to ad-
dress the issue did not render the decision legally incorrect and stating that "[i]n light of
the Supreme Court's action, we write on a clean slate").
114. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
115. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)) (amending the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 253, 253.66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994))). The 1972 amendments broadened
the application of Title VII by extending protection to government employees and re-
ducing the number of employees necessary for an employer to fall within Title VII's reach
from 25 to 15. See Davidson, supra note 83, at 206.
116. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2(2), 105 Stat. at 1071 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
117. Id. § 3,105 Stat. at 1071.
118. Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1366 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1982) for the proposition that no legal remedies are available to Title VII plaintiffs
(emphasis added)), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048
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"compensatory and punitive damages.""1 9 While the greatest effect of
this addition may be realized through its application to other anti-
discrimination provisions in Title VII, its implication for the section
704(a) context is to unravel the Polsby court's analysis of the policy
considerations.'"
Judicial interpretation of parallel anti-retaliation provisions in
anti-discrimination contexts other than Title VII and the interpreta-
tion of the term "employee" by governmental agencies involved in
the enforcement of Title VII provide further support for the position
adopted by the majority of circuits. Not only have the Equal Oppor-
tunity Employment Commission' and the Solicitor Generalp' taken
the position that former employees should be protected by section
704(a), but virtually all case law concerning the scope of the term
"employee" in the anti-retaliation provisions of other remedial labor
statutes supports this interpretation. For example, section 15(a)(3) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 prohibits "discharge
or... discriminat[ion] against any employee because such employee
has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter."n2 Similarly, section
158(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act includes in its defini-
tion of unfair labor practices "discharge or ... discriminat[ion]
against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony
(1993).
119. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072.
120. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365-66. The Polsby court also suggested that the legisla-
tive history of section 704(a) might support the exclusion of former employees from
protection. See id. However, courts and commentators alike have repeatedly noted the
absence of any useful legislative history regarding the anti-retaliation provision. See, e.g.,
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir.) (noting that sec-
tion 704(a)'s history provides no guidance concerning its scope), cer granted, 409 U.S.
1036 (1972), remanded, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Kattan, supra note 72, at 223 n.26 (citing 110
CONG. REC. 12813 (1964)) ("During the congressional debates the only change in the
provision, which was numbered § 705(a) in the original bill, was to renumber it
§ 704(a)."); Walterscheid, supra note 71, at 393 ("One of the inherent difficulties in ascer-
taining the purpose and extent of coverage of both the opposition and participation
clauses in Section 704(a) is the almost total absence of any legislative history."); see also
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that legislative
history is not useful in defining "employee"), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
121. See EEOC Compliance Manual § 614.7(f), at 614:0034 (Apr. 1988) ("It is a viola-
tion of § 704(a) ... to retaliate against a former employee.").
122. See Brief for Respondents at 9, Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993) (No. 92-
966).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994) (emphasis added); see Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet
Co., 548 F.2d 139, 147 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that the term "employee" in § 215(a)(3)
encompasses former employees).
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under this subchapter."1 The similarity of the broad, remedial na-
ture of these statutes to the purpose of Title VII makes their
interpretation highly persuasive in the Title VII context."z
Additionally, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
196712 (ADEA) contains an anti-retaliation provision that is virtually
identical to section 704(a). Section 4(d) of the ADEA prohibits dis-
crimination "against any... employees or applicants for employment
... because such individual... has opposed any practice made unlaw-
ful by this section."'27  While upholding the application of this
provision to former employees, at least two circuits have noted the
majority treatment of the analogous Title VII protection offered by
section 704(a). In EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Divi-
sion,2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit responded to the
contention that the ADEA anti-retaliation provision did not protect
former employees from retaliation by stating that "[t]he term
'employee' ... is interpreted broadly: it includes a former employee
as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the
employment relationship." '29 Similarly, in Passer v. American Chemi-
cal Society,m the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied
heavily upon the rationale of section 704(a) decisions to conclude
that "Congress could not have intended such an absurd result. 13
The history and logic of these decisions indicate that they carry
precedential value equivalent to a determination that section 704(a)'s
124. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1994) (emphasis added); see NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co.,
374 F.2d 576, 582-83 (1967) (finding that an employer's refusal to rehire an individual in
retaliation for the individual filing an unfair labor practice charge violated the NLRB
anti-retaliation provision). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
term with regard to the NLRA, see Davidson, supra note 83, at 209-10 (citing NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944)) ("Explaining that the term 'employee' was
not intended by Congress to be a term of art having a definite meaning, the Court stated
that the statute must be interpreted in light of the evils to be corrected and the end to be
achieved.").
125. See Moore, supra note 89, at 214-18.
126. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
127. Id. § 623(d). The ADEA's definition of "employee" also closely mirrors that of
Title VII by defining the term as "an individual employed by any employer." Id. § 630(t).
128. 821 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1987).
129. Id- at 1088 (citing Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.
1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir.
1977)).
130. 935 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[Section 4(d)] is parallel to the anti-
retaliation provision contained in Title VII... and cases interpreting the latter provision
are frequently relied upon in interpreting the former.").
131. Id. at 331.
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protection extends to former employees.'
Against this substantial and consistent backdrop of administra-
tive, judicial, and legislative interpretation of Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision, the court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 3 stead-
fastly adhered to the determination made in Polsby'M that section
704(a) did not protect individuals from discriminatory acts that oc-
curred after the employment relationship had terminated.
Inexplicably, the court employed a lengthy argument in favor of strict
statutory constructione5 and invoked policy considerations unrelated
to its conclusion ' to reestablish itself as one of two circuit courts de-
nying all section 704(a) protection to former employees. 7  The
decision cuts against the purpose of Title VII and will "weaken[] the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections" ' by li-
censing employers to undertake retaliatory practices provided that
they first terminate the employment relationship.
On its face, the Robinson decision relies heavily on the court's
purported loyalty to the rules of statutory construction, but in truth it
evidences the sheer unwillingness of the Fourth Circuit to acknowl-
edge the purpose of section 704(a).39 In an attempt to insulate its
132. Indeed, Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div. was cited favorably by the Fifth
Circuit in EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1991), in support of
the court's extension of section 704(a) protection to former employees. Although the
District of Columbia Circuit has not confronted the issue squarely, its reliance in Passer
on section 704(a)'s interpretation leaves little room for doubt about its position. See Pas-
ser, 935 F.2d at 330.
133. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996).
134. Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1364-67 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds
sub nora. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
135. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328-32.
136. See id. at 330-31.
137. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484,492-93 (7th Cir. 1991). But see infra note 169
and accompanying text (suggesting that the result in Reed would have been identical if the
facts were analyzed under the majority's test due to the alleged retaliation's lack of rela-
tion to the employment context).
138. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)) (responding to "recent decisions of the
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination").
139. The extent of this unwillingness is perhaps no more apparent than in Judge Ham-
ilton's dissenting opinion in the original panel consideration of Robinson. See Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., No. 93-1562, 1995 WL 25831, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting). In that opinion, the dissent criticized the panel's decision by presenting a
hypothetical that illustrated the "absurd results" that would stem from the decision:
[S]uppose Employee X, a minority, files a race discrimination charge against his
employer, Company A. In retaliation, Employee X's supervisor falsely adds
negative performance comments to Employee X's personnel file. Employee X
leaves Company A and accepts a job with Company B; thirty years pass. Em-
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decision-making from the policy considerations that had been so in-
fluential to other circuit courts, the Robinson majority labored to
construe the term "employee" unambiguously.' The ambiguity of
the term, as the dissent noted, is at least implicitly reflected in the
section 704(a) opinions of other circuits, 14' and an examination of Ti-
tle VII adjudication reveals that the meaning of the term is
consistently debated.142 Quite apart from the black-letter law
emerging from these decisions is the underlying persistence of the
term's refusal to subject itself to anything but temporary definition.
Nevertheless, the majority clung to Title VH's definition of employee
as "an individual employed by an employer ' ' 143 as the incontrovertible
meaning of the term.1" As the dissent noted, without resort to the
historical debates over the scope of the term, "[w]here the use of a
term in a particular context admits of more than one meaning, that
term is, ipso facto, ambiguous."' 45
ployee X leaves Company B and seeks a new job with Company C who requests
recommendations of X from A and B. Employee X's supervisor at Company A
died five years earlier; his replacement researches Employee X's personnel file
and writes a negative recommendation according to the information in Em-
ployee X's file. Under the majority's holding, Employee X can bring a suit
under § 704(a), alleging retaliation against Company A for conduct that oc-
curred thirty years earlier by a person no longer employed, let alone deceased.
Id. at *9 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It is ironic that in the face of such
imminent absurdity, see supra text accompanying note 44, a judge would engage in such
remote speculation to find potential inequity 30 years in the future. This questionable
hypothetical was omitted from Judge Hamilton's subsequent en banc majority opinion,
probably due to the fact that the hypothetical did not consider the requirement of a causal
link between the adverse employment action-the provision of a negative reference-and
the employee's engagement in a protected activity, a requirement that would preclude the
"absurd result." See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
140. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 329-30.
141. See Ud. at 335 (Hall, J., dissenting).
142. See Davidson, supra note 83, at 203 n.5 (citing EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d 32,
35-36 (3d Cir. 1983)) ("The word 'employee' is used in many federal statutes, but its legal
meaning changes depending upon its context. Consequently, a person classified as an
'employee' under one statute may not qualify as an employee under another."); Walter-
scheid, supra note 71, at 397 (discussing possible distinctions to be drawn from
section 704(a)'s use of the word "individual" rather than the phrase "employees or appli-
cants for employment" and concluding that "[p]erceived distinctions of the type noted
appear to be more a matter of semantics than any real variation"); see also Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing whether an associate at a
law firm is an "employee"), rev'd, 476 U.S. 69 (1984); Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488
F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing impact of referral service's control of em-
ployment on "employee" status); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556-57 (5th
Cir. 1972) (suggesting that certain volunteers might be "employees").
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
144. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330.
145. Id. at 335 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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While the presence of substantial contrary interpretation and
past dispute over the term's scope should have convinced the court of
the necessity to engage in serious policy consideration before with-
holding protection from former employees, the majority was not
persuaded.'" Instead, Judge Hamilton offered terse, contradictory
justifications for the majority view of legislative intent and relevant
policy and their respective effect on two distinct, but not wholly un-
related, aspects of the majority decision. In considering the
possibility of engaging in some statutory interpretation by virtue of
an exception to the no ambiguity-no interpretation nde,'47 the major-
ity refused on the basis that "both require Congress to have made
plain that it intended a result different than literal application would
produce."' 4 In making this determination, the court reasoned that
the inclusion of the term "'applicants for employment' as persons
distinct from 'employees,' coupled with its failure to likewise include
'former employees,' is strong evidence of Congressional intent that
the term 'employees' in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision does not
include former employees."' 49 However, simply by engaging in this
analysis the court concedes both the inherent ambiguity of the critical
term and the possibility of an alternative meaning. Additionally, the
court refused to consider the possibility that Congress included the
term "applicants for employment" in section 704(a) to prevent re-
taliation against those individuals who had not yet entered an
employment relationship, thereby broadening the statutory protec-
tion rather than limiting it.'5
146. See id at 332. Conceding that ambiguous terminology in statutes required judi-
cial interpretation, the Robinson majority nevertheless noted that in the case of
unambiguous statutes "if the statutory language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion." Id. at 329 (internal quotations omitted). The unambigu-
ous term thus limited the scope of judicial interpretation.
147. See id at 330. The exceptions include situations in which the literal application of
statutory language would lead to an absurd result or would produce a result demonstrably
at odds with the intent of Congress. See id at 329 (citing United States v. Ron Pair En-
ters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930)); supra
notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
148. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330. For the argument that Congress has made plain that it
intended something other than the Robinson result, see infra notes 167-68 and accompa-
nying text.
149. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330.
150. There is inherent appeal to construing an additional statutory term in a way that
broadens rather than limits the statute. For a discussion of the contrast between the
wording of the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), see Moore, supra note 89, at 214
n.59. The FLSA and NLRA do not include the term "applicants for employment." See 29
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Further, the court did not address the impact of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991151 on its interpretation of legislative intent. In Polsby,a2
the Fourth Circuit focused on the lack of explicit statutory legal
remedies and the inefficacy of equitable remedies as applied to for-
mer employees in justifying its refusal to extend Title VII anti-
retaliation protection beyond the employment relationship."' How-
ever, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 addressed both of these concerns, 154
which would appear to assuage the concerns of the Polsby court and
clarify congressional intent that section 704(a) be given a broad
reading. Nevertheless, the majority did not address the resolution of
this issue.
Similarly, in noting the unpopularity of its decision, the majority
failed to consider the ramifications of its own observations. The
court acknowledged that during a period of almost twenty years,
more than half of the other circuits had "interpreted the term
'employee' broadly to 'include[] a former employee as long as the
alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment
relationship.' ""'5 After criticizing the other circuits for infidelity to
statutory construction and reliance on policy, the Robinson majority
stated: "In no uncertain terms, Congress ... has chosen, through the
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, to protect 'employees' ... but
not to protect former employees."' 6 This conclusory statement ig-
nores the basic fact that, in the majority of circuits, section 704(a) is
U.S.C § 158(a)(4) (1994); id. § 215(a)(3). While it is possible to argue that the inclusion
of this term in section 704(a) is meant to limit protection, it seems ironic to suggest that a
substantively positive term is meant to limit the scope of the anti-retaliation provision.
See Moore, supra note 89, at 214 n.59. Moore suggests that this reasoning might be em-
ployed to eliminate judicial interpretation of the FLSA and NLRA anti-retaliation
provisions as persuasive support for section 704(a), but notes that this is not the "better
argument." See id.
151. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1994)) ("An Act [t]o amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and
improve Federal civil rights laws... [and] to provide for damages in cases of intentional
employment discrimination .... "). See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the relevant amendments.
152. Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365-67 (1992), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
153. See id. Although Title VII did not explicitly provide legal remedies for retaliation
victims, some courts had construed the statute's broad reach to implicitly include them.
See, e.g., Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1990)
(allowing compensatory damages to Title VII claimant).
154. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (discussing congressional exten-
sion of legal remedies to Title VII plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
155. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 331 (internal quotations omitted).
156. Id. at 332.
[Vol. 75
TERMINATE THEN RETALIATE
protecting former employees and has done so for many years.'
While legislative inaction may not conclusively reflect legislative in-
tent, one may reasonably infer that a Congress that enacted civil
rights legislation affecting the very provision in question as recently
as five years ago would have corrected such a widespread misappre-
hension-especially if it intended to exclude former employees.
Failing to consider these factors, the Fourth Circuit may have mis-
construed the very congressional intent it claimed to defend.
Possibly aware of the weakness of its position, the Robinson
majority claimed that "several other important considerations" sup-
ported its interpretation of section 704(a). 8 In actuality, these
"considerations" serve as a basis for a discussion of the reasons why
section 704(a) should be applied to retaliation that occurs after em-
ployment has terminated. Searching for support within Title VII, the
majority found that "the types of practices that Title VII forbids
strongly point toward the scope of its anti-retaliation provision not
extending beyond the employment relationship.""U9 However, while
other provisions of Title VII primarily address discrimination related
to employment relationships,'O section 704(a) must apply to post-
employment retaliation in order to effectively serve as part of the Ti-
tle VII enforcement mechanism. In this regard, the anti-retaliation
provision is different from the other substantive provisions of Title
VII; its purpose is to facilitate and encourage the filing of claims by
eliminating the fear of reprisal. By limiting its analysis to specific
provisions of Title VII, the court ignores the overriding purpose of
the legislation-the eradication of workplace discrimination.
Finally, the Robinson court contends that the second element of
a case of retaliation-adverse employment action-precludes appli-
cation of section 704(a) to the post-employment context.' Noting
the Seventh Circuit's similar conclusion in Reed, the court found that
an "[a]dverse employment action necessarily requires that the ad-
157. See, e.g., Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198-200 (3d Cir.)
(applying section 704(a) to post-employment interference with future employment pros-
pects), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 590 (1994).
158. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330-31.
159. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994)). The majority's rationale for
tying the scope of section 704(a) to other specific provisions of the statute, rather than
Title VII's essential goal of eliminating workplace discrimination, is not apparent.
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting failure or refusal "to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
161. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 331.
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verse action taken by the employer must be in relation to its own act
of employing the employee bringing the charge. 1 2  However, re-
gardless of the language used by the Reed court,'"3 the factual settings
are clearly distinct. Not only were Reed's allegations of retaliation of
questionable veracity; they were completely unrelated to her em-
ployment except for the fact that the accusations were aimed at her
former employer.'" In contrast, the alleged retaliation in Robinson
was a falsely negative employment reference,' which is much more
related to the employment relationship than the attacks, disturbing
phone-calls, and shootings complained of in Reed. In this sense, the
holdings of Robinson and Reed are distinct indeed.1"
Underlying these criticisms of Robinson is the purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision in the overall context of Title VII and the
techniques employed by other circuits to limit its scope while en-
hancing its efficiency. The primary legislative purpose behind section
704(a) is to remove the deterrent effect that fear of employer reprisal
has on employees who might question employment conditions. 67
Given the crucial role that individual claims play in the policing and
enforcing of discrimination claims, it is necessary to protect claimants
and encourage others to assert their legal rights.' If retaliation is
unrestricted, employment discrimination will be largely impossible to
police.
The majority of the United States courts of appeals have
adopted a test to determine whether an action is retaliatory under
section 704(a) that is both consistent with the language of the statute
and applicable to certain forms of post-employment retaliation. The
essential consideration for this test is whether the alleged retaliation
162. Id.
163. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991). Resolving the issue in
one paragraph, the Reed court refused to apply section 704(a) on the basis that "the al-
leged retaliatory activit[y] took place after the termination of Reed's employment and
was therefore not an adverse employment action." Id. For a discussion of the Reed deci-
sion, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
164. See Reed, 939 F.2d at 492; supra note 102.
165. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.
166. It is questionable whether the Reed court would have given such quick considera-
tion to a more job-related, though less heinous, form of retaliation.
167. See Kattan, supra note 72, at 217-18. Other impediments to employee assertion
of discrimination claims include the complexity of the law, the circumstances of the dis-
crimination, and the difficulty of producing evidence beyond personal suspicions. See id.
These impediments are much more difficult to address legislatively.
168. For a more detailed discussion of the Title VII enforcement mechanism, see su-
pra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 75
TERMINATE THENRETALIATE
"arises out of or is related to the employment relationship."1 9 This
treatment provides a workable solution to the competing interests of
encouraging valid claims and discouraging abuse by eliminating post-
termination conduct that is unrelated to the employment relationship
from consideration under section 704(a).'
In the face of legislative, judicial, administrative, and logical in-
terpretation and illustration, the Fourth Circuit has twice refused to
apply the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to job-related post-
employment retaliation and has thereby deprived section 704(a), and
thus Title VII itself, of its effectiveness. The resulting choice for em-
ployees is clear: remain in an abusive employment atmosphere to
ensure receipt of Title VII's full protection, or risk facing the retalia-
tion accompanying employment termination." The equally clear
message to employers is that "they have.., free rein to retaliate
against disfavored employees, so long as the employee is first termi-
nated."'" This absurdity and the resulting inconsistency between
Title VII's means and ends were surely not within the intent of the
Congress when it labeled an employee "an individual employed by an
employer."" 3 On April 22, 1996, the United States Supreme Court
169. Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994); see Robinson,
70 F.3d at 334 (Hall, J., dissenting); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055
(2d Cir. 1978). The distinction between Robinson and Reed is apparent when the facts of
the cases are considered under this analysis. The Reed court could have decided to deny
the section 704(a) claim under either the majority test or by refusing to apply the provi-
sion to post-employment acts of retaliation; the Robinson court had only the latter option.
170. One commentator has clearly presented both this test and the balance it strikes:
Congress, of course, did not intend the remedies available under Title VII to
expose employers to limitless liability for post-employment occurrences. For
example, the mere fact that a former employer and a former employee were
once engaged in a relationship covered under Title VII does not automatically
bring all of their future dealings under the protections of the statute. Con-
versely, however, if the "employment relationship" were narrowly construed so
as to terminate automatically when an employee ceases to be included on the
payroll, the statute would not protect any post-employment action, even if
clearly retaliatory and related to employment. Such an interpretation would
seem to frustrate the congressional intent behind Title VII. Therefore, in order
to balance congressional objectives in the enactment of the statute against the
potential for statutory abuse in the post-employment context, section 704(a)
should protect former employees only when the post-employment actions are
both retaliatory and related to employment.
Moore, supra note 89, at 219.
171. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 334 (Hall, J., dissenting) (noting that the outcome of this
choice is that "no reasonable employee will come forward if there is any chance that his
or her term of employment will soon end").
172. Id. (Hall, 3., dissenting).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
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granted Charles T. Robinson's petition for writ of certiorari.174 Given
the critical position of section 704(a) within the overall framework of
Title VII and the appeal of protecting individuals from retaliation
that "arises out of or is related to the employment relationship," em-
ployees can be hopeful that the Court will reverse the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Robinson. By eliminating a portion of the Title
VII enforcement mechanism, the alternative ignores the importance
of Title VII at a time when segments of our society need Title VII's
protection the most:
[T]he avowed goal of Title VII, to address the chronic ex-
clusion of blacks from the mainstream of the American
economy, is more distant than ever before. Overt discrimi-
nation has dramatically decreased, but twenty five years
after the passage of Title VII, the economic disparity be-
tween whites and nonwhites has widened, and racial
stratification has increased. The specter of racial caste, the
evil which Title VII was conceived to excise, is not only still
with us, but now has a stronger hold on the American soul."
TODD MITCHELL
174. 116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996).
175. Jones, supra note 3, at 352.
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